



Stockholm 2024-12-03

FOLLOW-UP REPORT REGARDING POWER OUTAGE IN VBDC, STOCKHOLM

GleSYS has released the following report, as a follow up to the Reason for Outage (RFO) report released August 14th, 2024 in response to the power outage in Stockholm on August 12th, 2024.

The RFO report outlined the background and immediate remediation actions in response to the outage. This report describes the implementation and verification of the long term actions taken to prevent recurrence of this issue.

BACKGROUND

The full background is described in the RFO report, available here: [RFO 2024-08-14](#)

The root cause of the power outage was incorrect settings of the new switchgear. The values of the maximum Amperes for the outgoing breakers was set too low. This was the result of flaws in the processes of the subcontractor responsible for installing the new switchgear.

The direct issue that caused the outage was permanently resolved 2024-08-12. It was resolved by setting the outgoing breakers to the correct values and verified to be effective both by the subcontractor and GleSYS personnel.

ACTIONS TAKEN

The following actions have been taken by the subcontractor responsible for installation of the new UPS and switchgear:

The following steps were added to their commissioning protocol for UPSes:

1. Set the value for the outgoing breakers for Net1/Input
2. Verify the plausibility of the setting of the outgoing breakers for Net1/Input
3. Set the value for the outgoing breakers for Net2/Aux
4. Verify the plausibility of the setting of the outgoing breakers for Net2/Aux

These added steps are mandatory and can not be skipped over, and the values of the settings must be added in the protocol.

These changes have been rolled out nationally, and all personnel performing commission on UPSes have received training on the updated procedure.

The following actions have been taken by GleSYS:

1. The proposed changes to the procedure above were evaluated and found to be effective in preventing recurrence of this issue.
2. The updated routine and associated protocol from the subcontractor has been verified by GleSYS.
3. An additional sanity check of subcontractors protocols has been added as a step to be performed by GleSYS before work commences on critical datacenter infrastructure.

CONCLUSIONS

The improvements of the protocol and additional training performed by our subcontractor has restored our trust in them.

The actions taken will prevent this from happening again, not only in our datacenters but also in other datacenters across Sweden.

Sincerely,

Glenn Johansson
CEO
GleSYS